data.ncup.team

domain not resolving

Tracked by C2 Tracker · Whois queried never

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Observed in malware

FamilySample SHA-256First seen
Flutter Banking Overlay (provisional) 06a47ef466f1… 2026-08-26
Flutter Banking Overlay (provisional) c7b6c2ea5a80… 2026-09-07

About Flutter Banking Overlay (provisional)

A **Flutter**-built Android banking trojan distributed as a betting/casino app (observed package `com.apkhadesbet`, a "hadesbet" gambling lure). Flutter apps compile their real logic to a native Dart "snapshot" inside `lib/<abi>/libapp.so` instead of to normal Java/DEX code, so both the behaviour and the C2 live in that `.so` file rather than in the usual Android code. **What it does** - Bundles a second payload APK (`assets/bound_payload.apk`) that it installs/loads. - Uses `flutter_inappwebview` (an embedded browser) to pop **fake bank-login overlays** on top of real apps and harvest credentials. Observed targeting **Canadian** institutions - RBC (`royalbank.com`), BMO (`bmodigitalbanking.com`), CIBC, Desjardins, Domino - plus the **MuchBetter** wallet (`muchbetter.com`), behind gambling lures (`hadesbet3.com`, `betonredcasinobe.com`). **How the C2 is recovered (binary-only)** The operator backend is a single hardcoded **HTTPS** base URL compiled into the Dart snapshot `libapp.so`, read directly from that file's string pool. It sits on a throwaway PaaS host (a `*.ondigitalocean.app` subdomain) and is deliberately kept separate from (a) the overlay-target **bank** domains the trojan phishes and (b) the attribution SDKs it ships (AppsFlyer / OneLink); the decoder filters those out so only the real operator backend is recorded. Family label provisional.