190.2.184.130:8080/
ip C2Tracked by C2 Tracker · Whois queried never
Network
- Network
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- CIDR
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- Country
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Contact
- Handle
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- Abuse
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Observed in malware
| Family | Sample SHA-256 | Role | First seen |
|---|---|---|---|
| WebSocket VNC Banker (provisional) | 50300b6973d5… | C2 | 2026-10-09 |
About WebSocket VNC Banker (provisional)
**WebSocket VNC Banker (provisional)** is an Android overlay/VNC banking trojan that talks to its operator over a WebSocket channel. The C2 endpoint is ws://<host>:8080/, where the host is held as an AES-128-CBC-encrypted, base64-encoded field decrypted at runtime with a PBKDF2-HMAC-SHA1 key (password, salt, 65536 iterations, 128-bit) and a string IV, then DNS-resolved before connecting (after an HTTP reachability probe). It injects overlays for credential theft, intercepts SMS and one-time passwords, pins a custom CA, and sends device headers (X-Device-Id, X-Device-Model, X-Api-Level). Strings are hidden behind a byte-array XOR decoder plus opaque-predicate (hashCode sparse-switch) control-flow obfuscation and a fill-array-data element-width-17 trap that breaks jadx/baksmali/androguard, so the C2 is recovered by running the sample decoders on a JVM. Seen both as a standalone app and as the payload of a Brazilian Correios-lure dropper (child package dune.firefly.imagine). Observed C2s include 107.148.78.150:8080 and 190.2.184.130:8080. Family label provisional.
Signing certificate
- Subject CN
- Android Debug
- Issuer CN
- Android Debug
- Valid
- 2016-10-23 → 2044-03-10
- Fingerprint
- 1e08a903aef9c3a721510b64ec764d01d3d094eb954161b62544ea8f187b5953
Other samples signed with this certificate? That's a lead worth checking - but not proof of a shared operator, since signing keys (and the Android debug certificate in particular) are widely reused. See the certificate page for every sample signed with it.