js.jiasuomg.xyz:443
domain C2Tracked by C2 Tracker · Whois queried never
Registration
- Registrar
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- Registered
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- Expires
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DNS
- Resolves to
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- Nameservers
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- Status
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Observed in malware
| Family | Sample SHA-256 | Role | First seen |
|---|---|---|---|
| VeyoTV Loader (provisional) | 3d3a0d4b3664… | C2 | 2026-10-12 |
About VeyoTV Loader (provisional)
**VeyoTV Loader (provisional)** is an Android loader/beacon distributed as a fake TV-streaming app ("VeyoTV", package `org.nova.work.link` / `com.work.mega.flash`). The real payload is native-packed. **Unpacking (static)** - `Sa` (Application) loads `libsa.so` and calls `nativeInit`. The native code XOR-decrypts asset `jikicfmxqdj` with the 32-byte Java key `Sa.AK` (repeating), yielding a `[count][len][dex]` blob loaded via `InMemoryDexClassLoader`. Fully recoverable statically (key is in Java; XOR confirmed in `libsa`). **C2 / source-to-sink (from the unpacked dex)** - Real C2: `Cf.S1 = https://js.jiasuomg.xyz`. `MainActivity.p0()` (from `onCreate`) posts an install beacon via `HttpURLConnection` to `POST https://js.jiasuomg.xyz/n/ir` (`Content-Type: application/json`, body `{"pkg","appName"}`), gated by a `reported` SharedPreferences flag. - Decoy (NOT C2): `Cf.W1 = https://veyo.tsnjh.vip/9fa2aa` is only loaded into a WebView (`Wv.loadUrl`) as a fake VeyoTV landing page. **Actor link**: signing cert `a40da80a59d170ca...` is shared with the WebSocket VNC Banker sample `679d70c0` - same actor. No banker/overlay behavior is present in this unpacked dex, so the label is corrected from Banker to Loader. Provisional.
Signing certificate
- Subject CN
- Android
- Issuer CN
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- Valid
- →
- Fingerprint
- a40da80a59d170caa950cf15c18c454d47a39b26989d8b640ecd745ba71bf5dc
Other samples signed with this certificate? That's a lead worth checking - but not proof of a shared operator, since signing keys (and the Android debug certificate in particular) are widely reused. See the certificate page for every sample signed with it.