kkyk1688.cc

domain not resolving

Tracked by C2 Tracker · Whois queried never

Registration

Registrar: —
Registered: —
Expires: —

DNS

Resolves to: —
Nameservers: —
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Observed in malware

Family	Sample SHA-256	First seen
RatHat	08ddce94ca93…	2026-10-01

About RatHat

AI-powered Android credential stealer / RAT (Zimperium, Sep 2026) posing as reward or finance apps (Tether, ReelShort lures). Serializes the live Accessibility tree to XML and queries Google Gemini to resolve on-screen targets and drive synthetic clicks. Heavy anti-analysis: a ~61 MB manifest padded with 0x9999 chunks, DEX poisoning, StringFog/StringCrypto, ZIP tampering. Config lives in a ZM26 container under assets/ (zm26_meta.json + .bt files); the C2 is the serverUrl field of server_config.json - plaintext in some builds, ZM26-encrypted in others. The primary FRP tunnel C2 is fetched at runtime by the Go agent liblocal-service.so, with libmedia_codec.so masquerading the frpc client.

Zimperium: RatHat - AI-powered mobile threat targeting credentials & bank accounts Zimperium IOC repository: 2026-09-RatHat

Signing certificate

Subject CN: TeeEd Local
Issuer CN: TeeEd Local
Valid: 2026-09-22 → 2056-09-14
Fingerprint: 36fe21c231e424ebd2ee54ff079104d93f6068d7836592c8e0577400c49be293

Other samples signed with this certificate? That's a lead worth checking — but not proof of a shared operator, since signing keys (and the Android debug certificate in particular) are widely reused. See the certificate page for every sample signed with it.