ACTAndroid C2 Tracker

3442b097e1741a656b8668fd…

sample

Tracked by C2 Tracker · indicators & metadata only, the APK itself is never published

Analyst notes

EagleSpy RAT (provisional). EagleSpy RAT (provisional) is a commercial Android remote-access trojan (EagleSpy, sold on underground forums) whose builds are repackaged onto a trojanized Telegram client (Telegram TLRPC/MessagesController classes are present). It provides VNC/screen control, keylogging, SMS/call-log theft, contact theft, overlay credential-phishing and 2FA interception.

Delivery

  • A thin installer (com.appd.instll.load, label “Blockchain”, REQUEST_INSTALL_PACKAGES) bundles a plaintext assets/childapp.apk and installs it. The child is the EagleSpy payload (com.geology.costumes).

C2 (binary-verified, source-to-sink)

  • Raw TCP socket. Host/port are base64 static fields initializeService.ClientHost / ClientPort, base64-decoded by utilities.tdhthoio...w45 and dialed in SecondarySocket: new Socket(InetAddress.getByName(host), port) -> sendBytes(...).
  • Build marker initializeService.ConnectionKey = base64("RWFnbGVTcHk=") = "EagleSpy".

Family label provisional. Indicators: tcp://159.223.110.159:30706.

Recovered configuration

delivery
Dropper com.appd.instll.load ('Blockchain') installs plaintext assets/childapp.apk = EagleSpy payload com.geology.costumes (sha256 d84b68157228f6f4c6812ed7abf459bd61ba3e7d2d434b1177ab0639cb556feb).
family_marker
ConnectionKey=base64('RWFnbGVTcHk=')='EagleSpy'
source_to_sink
initializeService.ClientHost=base64('MTU5LjIyMy4xMTAuMTU5')=159.223.110.159, ClientPort=base64('MzA3MDY=')=30706; SecondarySocket new Socket(getByName(decode(ClientHost)), parseInt(decode(ClientPort))) -> sendBytes.

Identification

SHA-256
3442b097e1741a656b8668fd3f3f17041876969eca3913eb78934a018260de8a
MD5
e3b18651ab2a9717d3fd6f361cfec8d5

Observed

Families
EagleSpy RAT (provisional)
First seen
2026-10-12

C2 configuration (1)

Every indicator extracted from this sample. One row per C2 - each links to its indicator page with Whois, DNS and certificate pivots.

IndicatorTypePortSchemeFamilyFirst seen
159.223.110.159 ip 30706 tcp EagleSpy RAT (provisional) 2026-10-12

Signing certificate

Subject CN
Android
Issuer CN
-
Fingerprint
465983f7791f2abeb43ea2cbdc7f21a8260b72bc08a55c839fc1a43bc741a81e

Relationships

Sample → C2 indicators, signing certificate (with every other sample signed by it) and family. Click a node for details, double-click to open its page.

Click a node to inspect it.

About EagleSpy RAT (provisional)

**EagleSpy RAT (provisional)** is a commercial Android remote-access trojan (EagleSpy, sold on underground forums) whose builds are repackaged onto a trojanized Telegram client (Telegram `TLRPC`/`MessagesController` classes are present). It provides VNC/screen control, keylogging, SMS/call-log theft, contact theft, overlay credential-phishing and 2FA interception. **Delivery** - A thin installer (`com.appd.instll.load`, label "Blockchain", `REQUEST_INSTALL_PACKAGES`) bundles a plaintext `assets/childapp.apk` and installs it. The child is the EagleSpy payload (`com.geology.costumes`). **C2 (binary-verified, source-to-sink)** - Raw TCP socket. Host/port are base64 static fields `initializeService.ClientHost` / `ClientPort`, base64-decoded by `utilities.tdhthoio...w45` and dialed in `SecondarySocket`: `new Socket(InetAddress.getByName(host), port)` -> `sendBytes(...)`. - Build marker `initializeService.ConnectionKey = base64("RWFnbGVTcHk=") = "EagleSpy"`. Family label provisional.

CYFIRMA: Unidentified Threat Actor Utilizes Android Malware to Target High-Value Assets in South Asia (EagleSpy / SpyNote variant)