391d22d89fc8eddfd3691e84…
sampleTracked by C2 Tracker · indicators & metadata only, the APK itself is never published
Identification
- SHA-256
- 391d22d89fc8eddfd3691e846d5e183c5925754443cacc0ba6a252858f290735
- MD5
- fe7ab00c4d7f0c2b343e61473ff24cee
Observed
- Families
- APT41
- First seen
- 2024-03-08
C2 configuration (2)
Every indicator extracted from this sample. One row per C2 — each links to its indicator page with Whois, DNS and certificate pivots.
| Indicator | Type | Port | Scheme | Family | First seen |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 116.205.4.18/control/ | ip | 33889 | https | APT41 | 2024-03-08 |
| 121.42.149.52/ | ip | 8002 | http | APT41 | 2024-03-08 |
Signing certificate
- Subject CN
- Android
- Issuer CN
- Android
- Fingerprint
- cc8c0d961d882f2bd8b8f7ef7d24eb92598749e7dc226a91f121293d8637775a
Relationships
Sample → C2 indicators, signing certificate (with every other sample signed by it) and family. Click a node for details, double-click to open its page.
Click a node to inspect it.
About APT41
Android surveillanceware (Lookout calls the two documented strains WyrmSpy and Dragonegg) attributed to the China-nexus actor APT41. Highly permission-hungry implants focused on call logs, SMS, contacts, audio capture and location tracking, masquerading as legitimate apps (e.g. fake security updates or romanticesque apps) and persist via a BootReceiver. The C2 server, password, version and a CustomId sit as meta-data in the manifest; additional http(s) C2 URLs hide as const-strings in a *Root class's DownRootPlan() method.