48e3f32e770f01b428f1c882…

sample

Tracked by C2 Tracker · indicators & metadata only, the APK itself is never published

Identification

SHA-256
48e3f32e770f01b428f1c88227230623ab5477d0243694e62a4cb6fee0036800
MD5
66342e3d0e2a066aa66c00e8103b9027

Observed

Families
APT41
First seen
2024-03-08

C2 configuration (2)

Every indicator extracted from this sample. One row per C2 — each links to its indicator page with Whois, DNS and certificate pivots.

IndicatorTypePortSchemeFamilyFirst seen
116.205.4.18/control/ ip 33889 https APT41 2024-03-08
121.42.149.52/ ip 8002 http APT41 2024-03-08

Signing certificate

Subject CN
Android
Issuer CN
Android
Fingerprint
c737d4485261f48a9f95405a1ba8cc38b55a6a87075da1f2e2617aec8d4a9d16

Relationships

Sample → C2 indicators, signing certificate (with every other sample signed by it) and family. Click a node for details, double-click to open its page.

Click a node to inspect it.

About APT41

Android surveillanceware (Lookout calls the two documented strains WyrmSpy and Dragonegg) attributed to the China-nexus actor APT41. Highly permission-hungry implants focused on call logs, SMS, contacts, audio capture and location tracking, masquerading as legitimate apps (e.g. fake security updates or romanticesque apps) and persist via a BootReceiver. The C2 server, password, version and a CustomId sit as meta-data in the manifest; additional http(s) C2 URLs hide as const-strings in a *Root class's DownRootPlan() method.