4922ff1a0cc0e906fcc5e73d…
sampleTracked by C2 Tracker · indicators & metadata only, the APK itself is never published
Analyst notes
ChinaSMSStealer. SMS-intercepting stealer exfiltrating over email rather than a network C2: the SMTP account and password sit as const-strings in the i()/j() accessors of Lcom/phone/stop/db/a;. Detected by a four-part manifest fingerprint (INTERNET, activity.MainActivity, receiver.SMSReceiver, service.SecondService). Indicators:
olaolao885566@vip.sina.com:o123ok.Identification
- SHA-256
- 4922ff1a0cc0e906fcc5e73dca6c347f6271afcaf9b6658816a43e9c0d2e19b8
- MD5
- 2c1ea21b8ab8f8b98ca2ee348014c424
Observed
- Families
- ChinaSMSStealer
- First seen
- 2017-02-14
APK metadata
Summary
- Type
- Android · APK
- Package
- yyv.cvcvbngh.bghbcfvgbnfgh
- Main activity
- com.phone2.stop.activity.MainActivity
- Internal version
- 98
- Displayed version
- 5.5.365
- Min SDK
- 8
- Target SDK
- 19
Signing certificate
- Valid from
- 2008-02-29 01:33:46
- Valid to
- 2035-07-17 01:33:46
- Serial
- 936eacbe07f201df
- Thumbprint
- 61ed377e85d386a8dfee6b864bd85b0bfaa5af81
- Subject
- C:US, CN:Android, L:Mountain View, O:Android, ST:California, OU:Android, email:android@android.com
- Subject email
- android@android.com
- Issuer
- C:US, CN:Android, L:Mountain View, O:Android, ST:California, OU:Android, email:android@android.com
Permissions (17)
Intent filters — actions
C2 configuration (1)
Every indicator extracted from this sample. One row per C2 — each links to its indicator page with Whois, DNS and certificate pivots.
| Indicator | Type | Port | Scheme | Family | First seen |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| olaolao885566@vip.sina.com:o123ok | — | — | ChinaSMSStealer | 2017-02-14 |
Relationships
Sample → C2 indicators, signing certificate (with every other sample signed by it) and family. Click a node for details, double-click to open its page.
Click a node to inspect it.
About ChinaSMSStealer
SMS-intercepting stealer exfiltrating over email rather than a network C2: the SMTP account and password sit as const-strings in the i()/j() accessors of Lcom/phone/stop/db/a;. Detected by a four-part manifest fingerprint (INTERNET, activity.MainActivity, receiver.SMSReceiver, service.SecondService).